"solipsism "In the primary, metaphysical, sense of the term, the solipsist believes that only they and their experiences exist. The outer world of shoes, ships, sealing‐wax—not to mention other subjects of experience—has been replaced by an internal world consisting only of the self and its conscious states. The solipsistic perspective is eloquently captured in Sylvia Plath's poem ‘Soliloquy of the Solipsist’:
I?
I walk alone;
The midnight street
Spins itself from under my feet;
When my eyes are shut
These dreaming houses all snuff out;
Through a whim of mine
Over gables the moon's celestial onion
Hangs high.
Metaphysical solipsism is not widely held. (Indeed, there is a sense in which no two solipsists hold the same view, for each denies the other's existence!) Where it does occur, solipsism is a sign of psychiatric disorder rather than philosophical profundity.
Individuals with schizophrenia often cycle between nihilistic and solipsistic moods—when in the grip of nihilism they appear to have lost experiential contact with their very existence, whereas the solipsistic mood brings with it an all‐encompassing self that threatens to submerge any awareness of the world as standing over and against them (Parnas and Sass 2001).
Solipsism exerts an influence on consciousness studies in its methodological rather than its metaphysical guise. The methodological solipsist recommends that explanations of psychological states bracket the subject's environment (Fodor 1980). The methodological solipsist does not deny that the subject's environment has a causal influence on their conscious states and processes—how could it not?—she holds only that this causal influence is of no interest to the study of consciousness.
Methodological solipsism has not gone unchallenged, and externalists of various stripes argue that the sciences of the mind need to take the subject's environment into account. Some content externalists argue that one can have meaningful thoughts and experiences only in the context of a community of thinkers. Others argue that one can have thoughts and experiences about certain types of physical objects and properties only in environments that contain objects and properties of the relevant type.
Solipsism exerts an influence on consciousness studies in its methodological rather than its metaphysical guise. The methodological solipsist recommends that explanations of psychological states bracket the subject's environment (Fodor 1980). The methodological solipsist does not deny that the subject's environment has a causal influence on their conscious states and processes—how could it not?—she holds only that this causal influence is of no interest to the study of consciousness.
Methodological solipsism has not gone unchallenged, and externalists of various stripes argue that the sciences of the mind need to take the subject's environment into account. Some content externalists argue that one can have meaningful thoughts and experiences only in the context of a community of thinkers. Others argue that one can have thoughts and experiences about certain types of physical objects and properties only in environments that contain objects and properties of the relevant type.
(Roughly, one couldn't have thoughts about cats unless there were cats to think about.) Others—vehicle externalists—argue that the vehicles of conscious states extend out into the subject's environment. Whatever their brand, externalists argue that consciousness depends in constitutive—i.e. not merely causal—ways on factors that are external to the subject in question, and that the methodological solipsist's attempt to study experience by bracketing the external is doomed to defeat.
Although externalism has its proponents, it is at present not much more than a promissory note. Few studies of consciousness have made any serious attempt to take environmental variables into account, and the mainstream focus of consciousness science is resolutely ‘solipsistic’ in its focus on the search for the neural mechanisms underpinning consciousness.
Tim Bayne
Bibliography
Fodor, J. (1980). ‘Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in the cognitive sciences’ . Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3.
Parnas, J. and Sass, L. A. (2001). ‘Self, solipsism, and schizophrenic delusions’ . Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 8.
Plath, S. (1981). ‘ Soliloquy of the solipsist.’ In Collected Poems.
How to cite this entry:
Tim Bayne "solipsism" The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. by Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans and Patrick Wilken. Oxford University Press Inc. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. 7 October 2011
Although externalism has its proponents, it is at present not much more than a promissory note. Few studies of consciousness have made any serious attempt to take environmental variables into account, and the mainstream focus of consciousness science is resolutely ‘solipsistic’ in its focus on the search for the neural mechanisms underpinning consciousness.
Tim Bayne
Bibliography
Fodor, J. (1980). ‘Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in the cognitive sciences’ . Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3.
Parnas, J. and Sass, L. A. (2001). ‘Self, solipsism, and schizophrenic delusions’ . Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 8.
Plath, S. (1981). ‘ Soliloquy of the solipsist.’ In Collected Poems.
How to cite this entry:
Tim Bayne "solipsism" The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. by Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans and Patrick Wilken. Oxford University Press Inc. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press. 7 October 2011
